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Stolen Art and Sovereign Immunity: The Case of
Altmann v. Austria
Michael D. Murray*
The United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari in the case of Altmann v.
Republic of Austria,1 thereby bringing to a national stage a case involving six
masterpieces by the famous Austrian painter, Gustav Klimt, which were stolen by
the Nazis from Ferdinand Bloch-Bauer, Maria Altmann's uncle, in the period
immediately preceding and during World War II. The paintings currently reside in
the Austrian National Gallery ("Austria"), an agency and instrumentality of the
Republic of Austria-the same place where the paintings were sent by agents of the
Third Reich after the Nazis looted the property of Mr. Bloch-Bauer, a Jewish sugar
merchant. 2 Austria had been annexed by Nazi Germany prior to these events and
Jews like Ms. Altmann's family were targeted for organized theft of their private
property, including valuable works of art, in contravention of the international laws
3
of war.
Certiorari was granted on a single issue:
Does the expropriation exception of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976
("FSIA"), 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3), afford jurisdiction over claims against foreign
states based on conduct that occurred before
the United States adopted the restrictive
4
theory of sovereign immunity in 1952?
Under the "absolute" theory of sovereign immunity, a foreign sovereign is
completely immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of another sovereign. 5 The
United States follows the "restrictive" view of sovereign immunity, which does not
automatically immunize a foreign sovereign from suit arising from the actions of a

* Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law. The author
gratefully acknowledges the input of Professors James Pfander and Thomas Ginsburg of the University
of Illinois College of Law, and Professor Richard Seamon of the University of South Carolina School of
Law, and the faculty of the University of Houston Law Center who heard the author's presentation of
the topic of this Article. The author also gratefully acknowledges the research supporting this Article by
David Wissbroecker, J.D. 2003, University of Illinois College of Law.
1. Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1187 (C.D. Cal. 1999) ("Altmann I"), aff'd,
317 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 2002) ("Altmann I1"), reh g deniedand reh 'g denieden banc, 327 F.3d 1246 (9th
Cir. 2003) ("Altmann III"), stay grantedpendingpetitionfor writ of cert., 123 S. Ct. 2129 (2003), cert.
granted,124 S. Ct. 46 (U.S. Sept. 30, 2003) (No. 03-13).
2. Altmann 11, 317 F.3d at 959-61.
3. Id.
4. Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 327 F.3d 1246 (9th Cir. 2003) ("Altmann III"), petition for
cert.filed, 2003 WL 22428418 (U.S. June 27, 2003) (No. 03-13).
5. See 48 C.J.S. INTERNATIONAL LAW § 46.
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sovereign nation or its instrumentalities that are private in nature, though it does
immunize the "public" actions of a sovereign. 6 The Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act of 1976 ("FSIA") 7 provides the exclusive basis for jurisdiction in United States
courts over civil actions against foreign nations and their agencies and
instrumentalities. 8 The FSIA defines "private" conduct as actions involving the
taking of property in violation of international law 9 or commercial dealings, such as
buying, selling10 and lending, that are equivalent to the commercial activity of
private parties.
The restrictive theory of sovereign immunity has been practiced by a number of
sovereign nations since the early part of the twentieth century, 1 but there is
disagreement as to when the United States first officially announced it would
adhere to this doctrine. Many courts and scholars have traced the official adoption
to 1952, by what has come to be called the Tate Letter. 12 In fact, there is a
fundamental misconception in some United States courts that the Tate Letter
effected a complete turnabout from a system of absolute sovereign immunity to one

6.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S.

§

451 (1987)

[hereinafter RESTATEMENT]; 14A CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

§ 3662

(3d ed. 1986) [hereinafter 14A WRIGHT & MILLER].

7. 28U.S.C.§§ 1602-1611 (1994).
8. Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 443 (1989). The FSIA
was an amendment to Title 28 of the United States Code, which removed the earlier provision in 28
U.S.C. § 1332(a) that allowed federal courts diversity jurisdiction over claims involving U.S. citizens
and a foreign state and replaced it with the provision codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a), providing for
"original jurisdiction without regard to amount in controversy of any nonjury civil action against a
foreign state .... " Section 1332(a)(4) of Title 28 still provides jurisdiction over a suit in which a
foreign state is a plaintiff against U.S. citizens where the amount in controversy requirement is met. The
FSIA also amended the removal jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441, to provide for removal to federal
court of actions brought against foreign states in state court. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d) (1994).
9. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (1994). The rationale for treating acquisitions of property that violate
international law as private acts comes from the legal presumption that sovereign nations follow
customary and conventional international law as a matter of course. When a state has engaged in
conduct that violates these principles, it is regarded as not having behaved in the manner of a sovereign
and thus is not entitled to the privileges afforded to sovereign nations. See West v. Multibanco
Comermex, S.A., 807 F.2d 820, 826 (9th Cir. 1987).
10. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) states:
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United States or of
the States in any case(3) in which rights in property taken in violation of international law are in issue and that
property or any property exchanged for such property is present in the United States in
connection with a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state; or
that property or any property exchanged for such property is owned or operated by an agency
or instrumentality of the foreign state and that agency or instrumentality is engaged in a
commercial activity in the United States; ....
11.
RESTATEMENT, supranote 6, § 451, pt. IV, ch. 5, subch. A, intro. Note.
12.
Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, Department of State, to Philip B. Perlman,
Acting Attorney General (May 19, 1952), reprinted in 26 DEP'T OF STATE BULL. 984-985 (1952), and in
Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 711 (1976) (App. 2 to opinion of White, J.)
[hereinafter Tate Letter].
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of restrictive sovereign immunity.13 This reading of
the history of foreign sovereign
14
immunity in the United States is simply incorrect.
Part I of this Article will briefly recount the principal facts of Altmann v.
Republic ofAustria.15 Parts II through IV will then address the principal arguments
that Austria has raised against the application of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act, namely:
1. That the FSIA would have an impermissible retroactive effect if it were to be
applied to Altmann's claims arising from operative16 facts that occurred before both the
effective date of the FSIA and the 1952 Tate Letter;
2.
That the conduct of the Nazi regime and its agencies and instrumentalities in
World War II, including Austria, in no way would have defeated the expectations of these
17
state parties that they would receive immunity from prosecution in foreign courts;
3.
That application of the FSIA in Altmann will open the door
to subjective,
18
inconsistent, and unpredictable applications of the FSIA in future cases.

I.

THE ALTMANN V. REPUBLIC OFAUSTRIA LITIGATION

In this case, plaintiff Maria Altmann seeks to recover ownership and possession
of six paintings by the world-renowned artist Gustav Klimt, which were owned by
her family before they were stolen by the Nazis in the period immediately
preceding World War II. These paintings currently are in the possession of
Austrian National Gallery, an instrumentality of the defendant, the Republic of
Austria. 19 The facts of the case are one chapter in the large scale art theft
perpetrated against Jews and other subject nationalities by Third Reich forces
known as the Einsatzstab der Dienststellen des Reichsleiters Rosenberg, Nazi

13. See, e.g., Joo v. Japan, 332 F.3d 679, 682 (D.C. Cir. 2003) ("Prior to 1952, the courts of the
United States generally followed the doctrine of 'absolute immunity' ... that is, the courts almost
always held a foreign sovereign immune from suit....
In 1952 the United States adopted the doctrine
of "restrictive immunity," as set out in the Tate Letter and later codified in the FSIA.").
14. See Michael D. Murray, Jurisdiction Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act for Nazi
War Crimes of Plunder and Expropriation, 7 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y (forthcoming Spring
2004). This Article examines the entire history of the United States' practice of foreign sovereign
immunity from 1812 to the present and concludes that the United States Supreme Court established a
fairly "restrictive" theory of immunity that was followed throughout most of the time period from 1812
to 1952 (when the 1952 Tate Letter was issued) in The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, II U.S. (7
Cranch) 116 (1812).
15. Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1187 (C.D. Cal. 1999) ("Altmann "), aff'd,
317 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 2002) ("Altmann II"), reh "gdenied and reh "gdenied en banc, 327 F.3d 1246 (9th
Cir. 2003) ("Altmann III"), stay grantedpendingpetition for writ of cert., 123 S. Ct. 2129 (2003), cert.
granted, 124 S. Ct. 46 (2003) (No. 03-13).
16. Brief for Petitioners at 11-12, 15-28, Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 123 S. Ct. 46 (2002)
(No. 03-13).
17. Id. at 12-13, 28-42.
18. Id. at 13-14,42-46.
19. Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1192 (C.D. Cal. 1999).
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20
Artistic and Cultural Minister Alfred Rosenberg's commando forces.
The paintings at issue were owned by Ferdinand Bloch-Bauer, the plaintiffs
uncle. 2 1 Bloch-Bauer left Austria in 1938, after the Nazi invasion and the resulting
Anschluss (annexation) of Austria.22 The Nazis took his home, his sugar business
and his artwork.23 Several nineteenth century Austrian paintings went to Adolf
Hitler's and Herman Grring's private collections. 24 Dr. Erich Fuerher, a Nazi
lawyer in charge of liquidating Bloch-Bauer's collection, chose a few paintings for
his personal collection. 25 Dr. Fuerher gave two paintings at issue in the case, Adele
Bloch-Bauer I and Apple Tree I, to the Austrian Gallery in 1941 in exchange for a
painting, Schloss Kammer am Attersee III, which Bloch-Bauer had donated to the
Gallery in 1936.26 The donation included a note that claimed to deliver the
paintings in fulfillment of Adele Bloch-Bauer's last will and testament. The note
was signed, "Heil Hitler." 27 Dr. Fuerher sold Beechwood in November 1942 to the
Museum of the City of Vienna, and in March 1943, he sold Adele Bloch-BauerII to
the Austrian Gallery. 28 Schloss Kammer am Attersee III was later sold to Gustav
Klimt's son.29 In 1961, this painting was donated to the Gallery.30
Bloch-Bauer died just a few months after World War II ended, but he took
preliminary steps to retrieve his stolen property before he died. 31 In 1946, the
Austrian Republic enacted a law declaring that all transactions motivated by
discriminatory Nazi ideology were to be deemed null and void.32 However, the
Republic often required the original owners of such property, including the owners
of works of art, to repay the purchase price to the purchaser before an item would
be returned.33 In addition, the Republic extorted donations of certain works of art
from the claimant's family in exchange for export permits to allow the removal of
other artworks from the country. 34 These allegations establish a prima facie case
for jurisdiction under the expropriation clause of the FSIA.35

20. See generally Menzel v. List, 49 Misc. 2d 300, 309 (N.Y.S.2d 1966); The Nuremberg Trial, 6
F.R.D. 69, 122-23, 154, 156-57 (1946).
21.
See Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 317 F.3d 954, 959-60 (9th Cir. 2002) ("Altmann 1I").
22. Id.at 959.
23.
Id.
24. Id.
Id.at 959-60.
25.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 960.
28. Id.
29. Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1193 n.6 (C.D. Cal. 1999) ("Altmann

I",).

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id.
Altmann 11, 317 F.3d at 960.
Altmann 1, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 1193.
Id.
See Altmann I 317 F.3d at 960.
Altmannl, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 1202-3;Altmann 11, 317 F.3d at 968-69.
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II. WOULD THE FSIA HAVE A RETROACTIVE EFFECT ON
LITIGATION INVOLVING FACTS THAT OCCURRED IN THE WORLD
WAR II ERA?
Austria's primary claim 36 against application of the FSIA in this case is that
such application would have an impermissible retroactive effect-namely, that the
application of the FSIA to the case would change the substantive legal rights and
liabilities of the parties with regard to past, completed events. 37 This assertion is
incorrect, as the following discussion will explain.
A.

THE FSIA

Is A JURISDICTIONAL

STATUTE

In its brief before the Supreme Court, Austria argues that the FSIA cannot
provide the basis for jurisdiction over Altmann's claims, because to do so would
remove Austria's absolute immunity from liability for claims arising from illegal
expropriations occurring in the Nazi era.38 Austria claims that "Congress plainly
intended section 1605(a)(3) [of the FSIA] to regulate and remedy expropriations 'by
39
foreign states in violation of international law ... on or after its effective date.
The argument continues:
[T]he FSIA's expropriation exception plainly would attach new legal
consequences. .. to foreign states for expropriations within their borders ....
[A]pplication of the statute would increase-indeed, create-liability of foreign states
for past expropriations, and impose new duties on foreign states with respect
40 to their
actions that occurred when foreign states were absolutely immune from suit.
In order for Austria's arguments to succeed, the Supreme Court must view the
FSIA as a statute that affects the substantive rights and liabilities of the parties,
rather than one that affects only the forum court's power to entertain claims that
will be determined by the application of other substantive law defining the rights
and liabilities of the parties. As described below, this approach to the interpretation
of the FSIA is fundamentally erroneous because the FSIA does not affect any of the
substantive claims and defenses of the parties on the merits of this dispute.
Contrary to Austria's assertion, nothing in the FSIA in general and section
1605(a)(3) in particular speaks to the remedy for expropriations that are found to be
in violation of international law. The substantive law that will determine whether

36. Brief for Petitioners at 11-14, Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 123 S. Ct. 46 (2002) (No. 0313). In its opening brief, Austria makes several arguments that overlap, but it is not difficult to discern
that these overlapping claims revolve around the definition of retroactivity and whether or not the FSIA
has a retroactive effect. Although the arguments refer to the United States practice of sovereign
immunity and foreign state expectations regarding the receipt of sovereign immunity as though they
were separate arguments, the actual legal issue implicated by these assertions is whether the FSIA
operates with retroactive effect on substantive rights, claims and defenses.
37. Id. at 11-12, 15-28.
38. Id. at 11, 15-20, 23-28.
39. Id. at 11 (emphasis added).
40. Id. at 12.
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or not Austria will be able to keep the Klimt paintings will be determined later by
conflict of law rules. 4 1 This substantive law will determine Altmann's rights and
Austria's liability. 42 The FSIA does not define expropriations; it only provides an
American forum for the assertion of claims regarding expropriations by foreign
43

states.

Austria has maintained that a suitable alternative forum for this suit exists in
Austria. 44 Thus, the FSIA merely allocates jurisdiction among available fora, or, at
most, adds additional, alternative fora for the action. 45 The FSIA is a jurisdictional
statute that can have no impermissible retroactive effect when applied to actions
filed after its effective
date, even if the actions arose from facts that occurred prior
46
to its effective date.
Since the very beginning, the concept of sovereign immunity in the United
States has been tied to the jurisdiction of the courts rather than the substantive
rights of the parties. In The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon,47 the Supreme
Court first recognized the concept of foreign sovereign immunity, and it is clear
that the Court viewed sovereign immunity as a jurisdictional issue.48 The Court
affirmed the lower federal courts' power to adjudicate cases against foreign
sovereigns, describing the jurisdiction of the courts in such matters as "absolute and
complete." 49 In fact, when the Attorney General asserted that suits involving
Court cut off this argument, finding that
foreign sovereigns were nonjusticiable, the
50
it was not worthy of extended discussion.
Soon after, the Supreme Court heard the case of The Santissima Trinidad, which
confirmed that as a matter of jurisdictional power, courts were competent to hear
cases involving foreign sovereigns. 51 The Court affirmed the holding of The
Schooner Exchange by finding that the exercise of in rem jurisdiction over a
foreign warship would not be appropriate; however, the Court determined that it

41. E.g., First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior De Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 62122 (1983).
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. See Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 327 F.3d 1246 (9th Cir. 2003), petitionfor cert. filed,
"2003 WL 22428418 at *5, *23 (U.S. June 27, 2003) (No. 03-13).
45. Jurisdiction-allocating statutes do not raise retroactivity concerns. See Hughes Aircraft Co. v.
United States ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939, 950-51 (1997).
46. See id.
47. The Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). See generally
RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, §451; 14A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 6, § 3662.
48. The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. at 136. Chief Justice John Marshall stated:
The jurisdiction of courts is a branch of that which is possessed by the nation as an independent
sovereign power. The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive
and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself. Any restriction upon it,
deriving validity from an external source, would imply a diminution of its sovereignty to the
extent of the restriction, and an investment of that sovereignty to the same extent in that power
which could impose such restriction.
Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 146.
51. The Santissima Trinidad, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 283, 353-54 (1822).
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was appropriate for courts to maintain jurisdiction over the personal property of a
foreign sovereign-the prize cargo taken by a foreign sovereign-because seeking
prizes was a private activity of a foreign state, not a public activity for which
jurisdiction might be withheld.5 2
The Supreme Court continued to view the issue of sovereign immunity as one of
jurisdiction in the twentieth century: In re Muir,53 Pesaro J,54 Pesaro 11,55 and
Pesaro 11156 all determined that sovereign immunity was a jurisdictional issue.
Chief Justice Stone's trilogy of The Navemar,57 Ex parte Peru,58 and Hoffman59
each held that sovereign immunity was an issue of jurisdiction rather than
justiciability and held that the courts were competent to determine the issues of
immunity from jurisdiction, with or without the input of the executive branch.6 °
After the issuance of the Tate Letter in 1952, courts continued to regard sovereign
61
immunity as a jurisdictional issue.
B.

THE PASSAGE OF THE FSIA DID NOT ALTER THE JURISDICTIONAL NATURE

OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY LAW

The FSIA codified the law of sovereign immunity; it did not create it.62 In
particular, it codified the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity into federal

statutory law. 63

The FSIA did not create jurisdiction where none existed-

52. Id. at 352-53.
53. In re Muir (The Glenedon), 254 U.S. 522, 532 (1921).
54. The Pesaro, 255 U.S. 216, 218 (1921). This is the first of three reported opinions in the
litigation involving the Italian steamship, The Pesaro. The Pesaro, 255 U.S. 216 (1921) ("Pesaro I"),
remanded to 277 F. 473 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) (Mack, Cir. J.) ("Pesaro II"), rev'd sub nom Berrizi Bros. Co.
v. Steamship Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 (1926) ("Pesaro III").
55. Pesaro11, 277 F. at 473.
56. Persaro111, 271 U.S. at 570.
57. Compania Espanola De Navegacion Maritima, S.A. v. The Navemar, 303 U.S. 68, 69 (1938).
58. Exparte Republic of Peru (The Ucayali), 318 U.S. 578, 587-88 (1943).
59. Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 32 (1945).
60. E.g., The Navemar, 303 U.S. at 75 ("The want of admiralty jurisdiction because of the alleged
public status of the vessel and the right of the Spanish government to demand possession of the vessel as
owner if it so elected, were appropriate subjects for judicial inquiry upon proof of the matters alleged.");
ExpartePeru,318 U.S. at 587:
Here the district court acquired jurisdiction in rem by the seizure and control of the vessel, and
the libelant's claim against the vessel constituted a case or controversy which the court had
authority to decide. Indeed, for the purpose of determining whether petitioner was entitled to the
claimed immunity, the district court, in the absence of recognition of the immunity by the
Department of State, had authority to decide for itself whether all the requisites for such
immunity existed.
Id; Hoffnan, 324 U.S. at 34-35 ("In the absence of recognition of the claimed immunity by the political
branch of the government, the courts may decide for themselves whether all the requisites of immunity
exist.").
61. Nat. City Bank of New York v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356, 362 (1955); Bernstein v.
N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschappij, 210 F.2d 375, 375-76 (2d Cir. 1954);
Victory Transp., Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336 F.2d 354, 354 (2d
Cir. 1964).
62. Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 488 (1983).
63. Id.

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS

[27:3

concurrent jurisdiction over suits against foreign nations often existed in state
courts in the United States or in foreign courts. 64 As discussed above, Austria notes
that jurisdiction over a suit to resolve the rights and liabilities of the parties in
Altmann exists in the Republic of Austria. 65 Thus, contrary to Austria's
assertions, 66 the FSIA did not create a forum where none existed any more than it
created liability where none existed. The FSIA merely clarifies the circumstances
in which federal courts will exercise jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns and it
removes the decision-making authority for this determination from the executive
67
branch and places it with the courts.

C.

THE

FSIA

IS A "JURISDICTION-ALLOCATING" STATUTE

The Supreme Court has recognized that the FSIA removed the existing federal
jurisdictional bases for suits against foreign sovereigns from a number of statutes,
including The Alien Tort Statute,68 Diversity Jurisdiction,69 Admiralty
Jurisdiction, 70 Interpleader, 7 1 Commerce and Antitrust 72 and Patents, Copyrights
and Trademarks, 73 and placed the exclusive basis for federal-jurisdiction over suits
against foreign sovereigns in the FSIA.74 Thus, the FSIA removed jurisdiction over
foreign sovereigns from other categories of federal jurisdiction and placed it within
a new category of federal question jurisdiction, supported by the fact that suits
against foreign sovereigns invariably involve federal issues of U.S. foreign policy
and international law. 75 This did not create jurisdiction where none existed76before.
In this respect, the FSIA is a quintessential "jurisdiction-allocating" statute.
D.

VERLINDEN DOES NOT STAND FOR THE PROPOSITION THAT THE FSIA
AFFECTS THE SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF THE PARTIES

In.what can only be characterized as a strategic maneuver or a bad case of artful
rhetoric, Austria has suggested that Verlinden B. V.v. Central Bank of Nigeria holds
77
that the FSIA enacted new "substantive" law regarding foreign states' liabilities.

64.
65.
66.

See Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 123 S.Ct. 1655, 1665-66 (2003).
See supra text accompanying note 45.
Brief for Petitioners at 27-28, Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 123 S.Ct. 46 (2002) (No. 03-

67.

H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 7-8 (1976); reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6605-06; 14A

13).
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 6, § 3662.

68. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1948).
69. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1948).
70. 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1948).
71.
28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1948).
72. 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1948).
73. 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1948).
74. 28 U.S.C. § 1330 (1976). See Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S.
428, 428-38 (1989).
75. Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 493-94 (1983). Suits initiated by
foreign states still may be brought under the diversity jurisdiction statute. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(4).
76. See Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 520 U.S. 939, 951 (1997).
77. Brief for Petitioners at 21, Altmann, 123 S.Ct. at 46 (No. 03-13). As will be seen below in this
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Austria argues that "congress enacted a new substantive law of foreign sovereign
immunity when it passed the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976. "78 This
section argues that
Congress' intent to codify in the FSIA a substantive law of sovereign immunity to
some extent consistent with the State Department's restrictive theory was recognized
by this Court in Verlinden, its first comprehensive consideration of the FSIA.... The
Act codifies the standards governing foreign sovereign immunity as an aspect of
substantivefederal law .... The Act further provides substantive definitions of what
constitutes a foreign state and commercial activity in the United States.... Thus, the
FSIA does not merely codify the State Department's restrictive theory of sovereign
immunity; it enacted an entirely new substantive doctrine of sovereign immunity that,
for the first time since The Schooner Exchange, eliminated the immunity
of foreign
79
states for certain expropriations of property within their own borders.
This intentionally vague use of the term "substantive" disguises the fact that
Verlinden did not hold that the FSIA changed either the substantive liability or
immunity of foreign states for expropriations or any other kind of conduct when
evaluated on the merits of the claim. 80 Rather, the issue in Verlinden was "whether
Congress exceeded the scope of Article III of the Constitution by granting federal
courts subject matter jurisdiction over certain civil actions by foreign plaintiffs
against foreign sovereigns where the rule of decision may be provided by state
law." 81 This clearly indicates a situation where federal procedural law-the
FSIA--determines the subject matter jurisdiction of the court, while state
substantive law determines the underlying rights and liabilities of the parties.
Verlinden holds that this situation does not violate Article III of the Constitution,
because the "'Arising Under' Clause of Art. III provides an appropriate basis for
the statutory grant of subject matter jurisdiction to actions by foreign plaintiffs
under the [FSIA]. ' 82 Nothing in this holding states whether foreign sovereigns will
be found liable for their actions when their rights are determined by the applicable
substantive law.
Austria also cites Ex parte Peru for the proposition that "[a] foreign state's
sovereign immunity is an aspect of substantive law, and not only a matter of
jurisdiction." 83 The actual context of the use of the term "substantive" in Ex parte
Peru-the word's only use in the entire opinion-is the following:
[T]he question which we must decide is not whether there was jurisdiction in the
district court, acquired by the appearance of petitioner, but whether the jurisdiction
which the court had already acquired by seizure of the vessel should have been

section, the only substantive issue resolved by Verlinden was the Article III subject matter jurisdictional
power of the courts to entertain actions brought by foreign plaintiffs against foreign sovereigns under the
FSIA, not an issue regarding the merits of the claims or defenses available to the parties.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 23.

80.
81.
82.
83.

See generally Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 491-99.
Id. at491.
Id. at 492.
Brief for Petitioners at 21, Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 123 S. Ct. 46 (2002) (No. 03-13).
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relinquished in conformity to an overriding principle of substantive law.
That principle is that courts may not so exercise their jurisdiction, by the seizure
and detention of the property of a friendly sovereign, as to embarrass the executive
arm of the government in conducting foreign relations. "In such cases the judicial
department of this government follows the action of the political
84 branch, and will not
embarrass the latter by assuming an antagonistic jurisdiction".
Thus, the term "substantive" is used in an analysis of jurisdiction-whether the
court is to maintain its jurisdiction or relinquish it, and whether that determination
is to be made by the court alone or upon the recommendation of the executive
branch. The entire discussion relates to jurisdiction, not the underlying rights and
liabilities of the parties to the suit.
E. THE

FSIA DOES NOT HAVE AN IMPROPER RETROACTIVE EFFECT UNDER
LANDGRAF AND HUGHES AIRCRAFT

In spite of Austria's efforts to identify the FSIA's "substantive" effects on the
rights of the parties, the evidence indicates that FSIA is a quintessential
jurisdiction-allocating statute under Landgrafv. USI Film Products.85 Thus, it does
not have an impermissibly retroactive effect when applied to actions arising from
facts that predate the statute. The courts apply newly enacted jurisdiction-allocating
statutes to pending cases, because the circumstances fail to implicate the conditions
for the general presumption against retroactivity. 86 Landgraf holds that,
"Application of a new jurisdictional rule usually 'takes away no substantive right
but simply changes the tribunal that is to hear the case' . . . . Present law normally

governs in such situations because jurisdictional statutes 'speak to the power of the
court rather than to the rights or obligations of the parties."' 87 Hughes further
states: "Statutes merely addressing which court shall have jurisdiction to entertain
a particular cause of action can fairly be said merely to regulate the secondary
conduct of litigation and not the underlying primary conduct of the parties."88
Landgraf presented two steps for the court to determine if a statute has
retroactive effect. First, the court must learn whether Congress expressly indicated
that the new statute should be applied retroactively; and second, it must learn
"whether the new statute would have retroactive effect, i.e., whether it would
impair rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a party's liability for past
89
conduct, or impose new duties with respect to transactions already completed.
Landgrafstated that, "Even absent specific legislative authorization, application of
new statutes passed after the events in suit is unquestionably proper in many

84.
(1882)).
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 588 (1943) (citing United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 209
Landgrafv. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994).
See Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 520 U.S. 939, 951 (1997).
Landgraf 511 U.S. at 274 (internal citations omitted).
Hughes Aircraft, 520 U.S. at 95 1.
Landgraf 511 U.S. at 280.
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situations."90 The opinion also noted, "A statute does not operate 'retrospectively'
merely because it is applied in a case arising from conduct antedating the statute's
enactment... or upsets expectations based in prior law." 91 In determining whether
the statute has retroactive effect, the court "must ask whether the new provision
attaches new legal consequences to events completed before its enactment." 92 In
making this determination, the court must consider "the nature and extent of the
change in the law and the degree of connection between the operation of the new
rule and a relevant past event." 93 The court must be aware that "every statute,
which takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a
new obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability, in respect
to
' 94
transactions or considerations already past, must be deemed retrospective. "
By contrast, statutes that confer or oust jurisdiction or change procedural rules,
"may often be applied in suits arising before their enactment without raising
concerns about retroactivity." 95 Landgraf stated, "Because rules of procedure
regulate secondary rather than primary conduct, the fact that a new procedural rule
was instituted after the conduct giving rise to the suit does not make application of
' 96
the rule at trial retroactive."
Landgrafreviewed several cases involving procedural or remedial changes that
were held not to affect antecedent rights in an impermissible way:
In Thorpe [v. Housing Authority of Durham, 393 U.S. 268 (1969)], we held that an
agency circular requiring a local housing authority to give notice of reasons and
opportunity to respond before evicting a tenant was applicable to an eviction
proceeding commenced before the regulation issued. Thorpe shares much with both
the "procedural" and "prospective-relief' cases.... Thus, we noted in Thorpe that
new hearing procedures did not affect either party's obligations under the lease
agreement between the housing authority and the petitioner... and, because the
tenant had "not yet vacated," we saw no significance in the fact that the housing
authority had "decided to evict her before the circular was issued,".... The Court in
Thorpe viewed the new eviction procedures as "essential to remove a serious
impediment to the successful protection of constitutional rights."

Like the new hearing requirement in Thorpe, the attorney's fee provision at issue in
Bradley [v. School Board of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696 (1974)] did not resemble the
cases in which we have invoked the presumption against statutory retroactivity.
Attorney's fee determinations, we have observed, are "collateral to the main cause of
action" and "uniquely separable from the cause of action to be proved at trial."97

90.

Id. at 273.

91. Id. at 269 (internal citations omitted).
92. Id. at 269-70.
93. Id. at 270.
94. Id. at 269 (quoting Soc'y for Propagation of the Gospel v. Wheeler, 22 F. Cas. 756, 767
(C.C.D.N.H. 1814) (No. 13,156)).
95. Id. at 274-75.
96. Id. at 275.
97. Id. at 276-277 (internal citations omitted).
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Sovereign immunity determinations are collateral to the main cause of action
and are therefore separable from the cause of action to be proved at trial. At most,
the FSIA may be viewed as removing certain impediments to the successful
prosecution of claims, such as the difficulties of serving process on foreign
sovereigns 98 and executing judgments obtained against foreign sovereigns. 99 The
immunity provisions are procedural and jurisdictional. They affect where and how
suits against a foreign sovereign may be brought, but they do not create a
competent forum to hear claims where no such forum existed before. United States
courts have consistently held that federal courts have the power to adjudicate
claims against foreign sovereigns. The determination of immunity is a collateral
determination that addresses whether the court should refrain from exercising this
power based on the circumstances at the time the suit was filed.' 00
The Supreme Court has held that the FSIA was not intended to affect
substantive law concerning the rights of foreign states. 10 1 "The language and
history of the FSIA clearly establish that the Act was not intended to affect the
substantive law determining the liability of a foreign state or instrumentality, or the
attribution of liability among instrumentalities of a foreign state." 10 2 Section 1606
of the FSIA provides that, "As to any claim for relief with respect to which a
foreign state is not entitled to immunity ... the foreign state shall be liable in the
same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like
circumstances." 10 3 The legislative history of the FSIA confirms this fact:
The bill is not intended to affect the substantive law of liability. Nor is it intended to
affect... the attribution of responsibility between or among entities of a foreign state;
for example, whether the proper entity of a foreign state has been
10 4 sued, or whether an
entity sued is liable in whole or in part for the claimed wrong.
The Supreme Court has not ruled directly on the issue of whether the FSIA can
be applied retroactively, but the concept of a permissible retrospective application
has been considered in several cases. The effective date of the FSIA is January 19,
1977.105 In FirstNational City Bank v. Banco ParaEl Comercio Exteriorde Cuba,
the court did not question the applicability of the FSIA to conduct occurring in
1960-61 (in this case, Cuban expropriations), despite the fact that the acts in issue
occurred before the FSIA's effective date.' 0 6 Similarly, the Verlinden court did not
question the applicability of the FSIA to transactions occurring in 1975.107 Earlier,
in reference to the Tate Letter of 1952 that was codified in the FSIA, the court in

98. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1608 (1994).
99. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1610 (1994).
100. See Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 123 S. Ct. 1655, 1662-63 (2003).
101. First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 620-21
(1983).
102. Id. at 620.
103. 28 U.S.C. § 1606 (1994).
104. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487 at 12 (1976).
105. Pub. L. 94-583 § 8.
106. FirstNat'l City Bank, 462 U.S. at 619-21.
107. Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 483 & n.2 (1983).
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National City Bank of New York applied the principles of the 1952 letter to
transactions that occurred in 1920 and 1947-48.1°8
In 1983, the Supreme Court ruled that the FSIA did not answer the act of state
justiciability issues, because "[t]he language and history of the FSIA clearly
establish that the Act was not intended to affect the substantive law determining the
liability of a foreign state or instrumentality, or the attribution of liability among
instrumentalities of a foreign state."' 10 9 The Supreme Court construed the FSIA as a
jurisdictional provision that did not change the antecedent rights of sovereign
nations.' 10 This construction contrasts with Hughes Aircraft, in which an
amendment to a jurisdictional provision of the federal False Claims Act removed
the bar to qui tam actions that arose from facts previously reported to the
government."' This amendment removed an affirmative defense previously
available on the merits of the case and in effect created a new qui tam cause of
action for false claims previously disclosed to the government where none had
112
existed before.
The FSIA also contrasts with the decision in Landgraf in which certain
provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 substantially changed defendants'
exposure to liability and increased the damages to which defendants might be
called upon to pay, thus attaching new legal consequences to events completed
before its enactment. 113 In contrast to the provision in the 1991 Act that provided
for a jury trial in cases in which compensatory damages were claimed (and which
the Supreme Court held to be a purely procedural change), the provision providing
for the recovery of compensatory damages created a new cause of action for
monetary relief for persons who were victims of a hostile work environment but
were not constructively discharged. Thus, it created a new liability for damages for
their employers. 114 The change in the 1991 Act was not a purely procedural or
jurisdictional change that could be applied to pending actions arising from facts
predating the effective date of the statute but instead was a change that affected the
actual liability of employers with regard to their past conduct.
The FSIA did not take away a substantive defense to liability from foreign
sovereigns, nor did it change the legal consequences of acts completed before the
effective date of the statute. 115 Sovereign immunity has always been regarded as a
matter of comity and grace extended by the good will of a territorial sovereign, but

108. 348 U.S. at 357 n.1. Similarly, in Bernstein v. N. V Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche,the
court applied the principles stated in the 1949 Tate Letter to Nazi conduct preceding and during World
War H1.210 F.2d 375, 375-76 (2d Cir. 1954).
109. First Nat'l City Bank, 462 U.S. at 620.
110. Id.
at 620-21.
111.
Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 520 U.S. 939, 946 (1997).
112. Id. at 948-50.
113. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 250, 282-83 (1994).
114. Id. at 283.
115.
As stated above, the changes made by the FSIA are in what courts can hear an action, not
whether a foreign sovereign shall or shall not be liable for its conduct. See supra text accompanying
notes 75-77.
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never as a right of the foreign sovereign.11 6 Prior to the enactment of the FSIA and
the 1952 Tate Letter, the jurisdictional power of the U.S. courts to entertain suits
involving foreign sovereigns was not questioned."17 In the absence of proper
suggestions of immunity asserted through proper channels, jurisdiction over foreign
states remained intact in spite of a foreign government's attempts to communicate a
defense of immunity through other channels. 18 Recommendations made by the
State Department were not consistent-sometimes a negative recommendation was
made, sometimes a request was communicated without comment on the merits of
the claim, and sometimes the executive branch was simply silent in the face of
requests., 9 A favorable suggestion of immunity depended on the good will and
good relations between the United States and the foreign sovereign at the time of
the suit, not at the time the events occurred.' 20 There is nothing in the history of
sovereign immunity in the United States that supports a vested right of a foreign
sovereign to assert an affirmative defense of absolute immunity in United States
courts-instead, foreign nations have only been granted immunity from suit at the
discretion of the United States as a matter of grace and comity121
F.

IN ORDER TO GRANT AUSTRIA THE RELIEF IT SEEKS, THE SUPREME COURT
MUST OVERTURN DOLE FOOD

In Dole Food v. Patrickson,122 the Supreme Court interpreted the FSIA as a
jurisdictional statute. If it is a jurisdictional statute, the courts must evaluate the
foreign sovereign's state of affairs at the time of suit, not when the events at issue
occurred.' 23 The defendant in Dole Foodattempted to assert an affirmative defense
of sovereign immunity under the FSIA based on its status as a foreign state-owned

116. See Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480,486 (1983).
117. See supra cases and text accompanying notes 48-62.
118. E.g., In re Muir, 254 U.S. 522 (1921); The Pesaro, 255 U.S. 216 (1921); In re Hussein Lutfi
Bey, 256 U.S. 616, 616-17 (1921); The Gul Djemal, 264 U.S. 90, 91-94 (1924); Compania Espanola de
Navegacio Maritima, S.A. v. The Navemar, 303 U.S. 68, 73-74 (1938).
119. Compare In re Muir, 254 U.S. at 522, In re Hussein Lutfi Bey, 256 U.S. at 616-17, and The
Gul Djemal, 264 U.S. at 91-94, with The Navemar, 303 U.S. 68, 73-74 (1938) and The Pesaro, 255 U.S.
216 (1921).
120. E.g., In re Muir, 254 U.S. at 522 (court considered British requisition of ship for use as
admiralty transport at time of suit); In re Hussein Lutfi Bey, 256 U.S. at 616-17 (court considered status
of Turkish ship in light of break off of relations between United States and Ottoman Turkey at time of
suit); The Gul Djemal, 264 U.S. at 91-94 (same); The Navemar, 303 U.S. at 73-74 (court considered
status of ship requisitioned by Spanish government at time of suit); Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S.
578, 588 (1943) (court considered the good relations between Peru and the United States at time of suit).
121. See Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 123 S. Ct. 1655, 1663 (2003) (sovereign immunity under
the FSIA is a jurisdictional protection extended by grace of the host nation, not an affirmative defense to
liability rooted in the status of the party); Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 486
(1983) (sovereign immunity protection is extended as a matter of comity, not as a matter of right); The
Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136-37 (1812) (territorial jurisdiction is
"relaxed" in the case of foreign sovereign defendants as a matter of comity and "good offices").
122. Dole Food, 123 S. Ct. at 1662-63.
123. Id. at 1662-63.
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enterprise at the time when the events at issue in the suit occurred. 124 The Court
rejected the claim, noting that the only relevant time frame was the time of the
initiation of the suit. At that time, the defendant ceased to be majority-owned and
controlled by a foreign state, and thus, the defendant failed to meet the FSIA's
definition of an agency or instrumentality of a foreign sovereign. 125 The Court
stated that the ruling was "consistent with the 'longstanding principle that the
jurisdiction26of the Court depends upon the state of things at the time of the action
brought."1
Austria claims that the FSIA cannot be applied to provide jurisdiction over
Altmann's claims, which arose in the World War II era and before the enactment of
the FSIA. 127 The crux of the argument is that this case would have been dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction based on the sovereign immunity of Austria if the case had
been brought in 1948,128 so it is improper to allow jurisdiction over Austria in a suit
filed in 2000 under the FSIA.' 2 9 This flatly contradicts Dole Food's holding that
"the jurisdiction of the Court depends upon the state of things at the time of the
action brought."' 130 Therefore, in order for the Court to grant Austria's petition, it
must reverse Dole Food and declare that the application of the FSIA does not
depend on the status of the parties at the time of filing but depends instead on their
status at the time the operative facts occurred.
III. WOULD AUSTRIA HAVE ENJOYED SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY FOR
CLAIMS TO RECOVER PROPERTY STOLEN BY THE NAZIS
DURING WORLD WAR II?
Austria's second major argument is that it would never have been subject to suit
in the United States if Altmann's claim had been brought in the post-World War II
era prior to the promulgation of the 1952 Tate Letter.13 ' Austria claims that there
would have been no diminished expectation of immunity, even though Austria
willingly held onto valuable property1 32 that had been looted by the Nazis
immediately prior to and during the war.
This argument is irrelevant; the discussion in the section above shows that it
does not matter what Austria expected in 1948, because sovereign immunity
determinations are made at the time of filing and are based on the parties' status at

124. Id. at 1662.
125. Id.at 1663.
126. Id. at 1662 (quoting Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 207 (1993); Mollan v.
Torrance, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 537, 539 (1824)) (emphasis added).
127. Brief for Petitioners at 11-12, 15-28, Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 123 S. Ct. 46 (2002)
(No. 03-13).
128. E.g., Brief for Petitioners at 11, 28, Altmann, 123 S. Ct. at 46 (No. 03-13).
129. See id.Austria conspicuously ignores Dole Food in its Opening Brief, even though the case
clearly is on point and controlling.
130. Dole Food, 123 S. Ct. at 1662 (quoting Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 207
(1993); Mollan v. Torrance, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 537, 539 (1824)) (emphasis added).
131.
Brief for Petitioners at 28-42.
132. Id.

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS

[27:3

that time. The Court should not consider what might have happened if the suit had
been brought immediately after the war-it should only evaluate the application of
the FSIA, a jurisdictional statute, based on the status of the Republic of Austria and
the Austrian National Gallery in 2000. To the extent that Austria's second
argument is given any further credence, it must be viewed in light of four principles
of sovereign immunity in United States law:
First, that the United States has held that sovereign immunity can be
withdrawn at any time simply by giving notice to the international
community that immunity will not be extended;
Second, the United States has exercised this right from time to time, giving
notice that immunity will not be extended to certain countries or in certain
situations, most notably (for this discussion) being the notice that
jurisdictional immunities would not be extended in cases involving Nazi
plunder and expropriation;
Third, sovereign immunity decisions have always been made at the time of
suit; and
Fourth, the Nazis and their collaborators forfeited their rights, if any, to
sovereign immunity based on their perpetration ofjus cogens violations and
other violations of firmly established restrictions of customary and
conventional international law.
The Supreme Court, since the time of the Santissima Trinidadand The Schooner
Exchange cases, has made it abundantly clear that sovereign immunity is a
privilege extended by comity in the interests of foreign policy and may be removed
at any time by giving notice. 133 Austria should have no expectation that it would
receive sovereign immunity from the jurisdiction of United States courts for events
perpetrated during wartime. Contrary to Austria's arguments,1 34 United States
authorities indicated that immunity should be extended only to "friendly" foreign
sovereigns. 135 Obviously, an active belligerent engaged in armed conflict against
the United States is not a friendly foreign sovereign, as revealed by the treatment of
belligerent powers in actions arising from the wars in which The United States
36
participated. 1

133. See The Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 137, 146 (1812); The
Santissima Trinidad, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 283, 353 (1822). See also Dole Food, 123 S. Ct. at 1663;
Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983).
134. Brief for Petitioners at 31-35, Admann 123 S. Ct. at 46 (No. 03-13).
135. The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 144; The Santissima Trinidad, 20 U.S. (7
Wheat.) at 352-53; The Johnson Lighterage Co. No. 24, 231 F. 365, 368 (D.N.J. 1916); Ex parte
Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 589 (1943); Republic of Mex. v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 34-35 (1945).
136. In fact, throughout much of the United States' history, courts applied the doctrine that the
government could seize-without compensation-the property of a foreign belligerent or that of a
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Secondly, the United States' executive branch gave notice to foreign states from
time to time regarding the extension or withholding of immunity in certain
situations-the most important of these examples being the publications regarding
the freedom of U.S. courts to adjudicate claims arising from the actions of Nazi
Germany and its affiliates in World War 11.1 37 The State Department and executive
branch of the United States emphasized on several occasions during and after
World War II that U.S. courts would entertain suits arising from acts of Nazi
plunder, looting and discriminatory expropriation perpetrated against people under
their domination and control. 138 Since sovereign immunity may be withdrawn by
giving notice, the Nazi regime and its allies, including Austria, were given notice
on several occasions during and after World War II that immunity would not be
extended to preclude the redress of war crimes involving the property of subject
peoples in municipal courts of the United States. The 1952 Tate Letter and the
FSIA itself were simply further proclamations of United States policy, in which the
U.S. informed the world of the terms under which it would extend jurisdictional
immunity to foreign sovereigns.
In spite of the clarity of these announcements, Austria claims that no reported
opinion had allowed in personam jurisdiction over any nation for a World War II
era expropriation claim before the enactment of the FSIA. 139 This may technically
be true--only because of Austria's artful wording of its statement-but Austria is
neglecting the importance of the Bernstein opinion. 140 In Bernstein, the Second
Circuit followed the State Department's recommendation to permit a suit to recover
property stolen by the Nazis in the pre-war period. 141 Since the enactment of the
FSIA, at least one court (in addition to Altmann) has applied the FSIA to allow
42
claims arising in the World War II era to proceed.'

domestic entity in rebellion and the courts were without jurisdiction to review such actions. See Miller
v. United States, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 268 (1870); Ribas y Hijo v. United States, 194 U.S. 315 (1904);
Herrera v. United States, 222 U.S. 558 (1912); Deutsch-Australische Dampfschiffs Gesellschaft v.
United States, 59 Ct. Cl. 450 (1924).
137. See Declaration Regarding Forced Transfers of Property in Enemy-Controlled Territory,
DEP'T ST. BULL., Jan. 1943, at 21-22 (quoted in Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 327 F.3d 1246, 124647 (9th Cir. 2003) ("Altmann III"); Jurisdiction of United States Courts Re Suits for Identifiable
PropertyInvolved in Nazi Forced Transfers, State Dep't Press Release No. 296, reprinted in Bernstein
v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche, 210 F.2d 375, 375-76 (2d Cir. 1954); Letter from Jack B. Tate,
Acting Legal Advisor, Department of State, to the Attorneys for the plaintiff in Civil Action No. 31-555
in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (April 13, 1949), quoted in
Bernstein, 210 F.2d at 376 [hereinafter 1949 Tate Letter]. See also Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 317
F.3d 954, 965-66 (9th Cir. 2002) ("Altmann II).
138. DeclarationRegarding Forced Transfers of Propertyin Enemy-Controlled Territory, DEP'T
ST. BULL., Jan. 1943, at 21-22; Jurisdictionof United States Courts Re Suits for Identifiable Property
Involved in Nazi Forced Transfers, State Dep't Press Release No. 296; 1949 Tate Letter, supra note 137.
139.
Brief for Petitioners at 33, Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 123 S.Ct. 46 (2002) (No. 03-13).
140. Bernstein, 210 F.2d at 375-76.
141.
1949 Tate Letter, supra note 137.
142. Haven v. Republic of Poland, 68 F. Supp. 2d 943 (N.D. Ill.
1999), aff'd, 215 F.3d 727 (7th
Cir. 2000). See also Princz v. Fed. Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (jurisdiction
over World War II tort claims is appropriate under FSIA). The District of Columbia Circuit later
retreated from this position in Joo v. Japan, 332 F.3d 679, 682-5 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
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Austria attempts to distinguish Bernstein on the grounds that the State
143
Department's letter to the court referred to the "Nazi Confiscations" in Europe,
and that the case was brought against a Dutch corporation, the recipient of property
stolen by the Nazis, and does not refer to Austria or actions taking place in
Austria. 144 However, Bernstein is directly on point, because it involved a claim
against the holder of proceeds of property confiscated by the Nazis rather than the
German government itself; 145 thus, it mirrors the position of the Austrian National
Gallery exactly. The Bernstein letter reiterates the position of the executive branch,
freeing United States courts from constraints on the exercise of their jurisdictionto
remedy claims for recovery of looted and expropriated property of subject peoples
in the World War II era, stating:
The policy of the Executive, with respect to claims asserted in the United States for
the restitution of identifiable property (or compensation in lieu thereof) lost through
force, coercion, or duress as a result of Nazi persecution in Germany, is to relieve
American courts from any restraint upon146the exercise of their jurisdiction to pass upon
the validity of the acts of Nazi officials.
Nothing could be a clearer statement by the State Department that jurisdictional
issues such as sovereign immunity do not prevent the courts' exercise of
jurisdiction to evaluate claims against either the Nazi regime itself or the holders of
property stolen by the Nazis. Austria cannot seriously expect to hold onto property
stolen by Nazi agents simply because at one time the Austrian nation might not
have been a completely willing participant in the Third Reich.
Third, sovereign immunity decisions have always been made at the time of suit,
and foreign sovereigns virtually have sat at the mercy of the State Department,
which would make or withhold suggestions based on the status of U.S. relations
with the foreign power at the time of the suit, rather than not at the time the events
from which the suit arose transpired. 147 Thus, any expectations as to immunity
must be formed at the ti me of suit, not at the time the events occurred. This is the
48
principle affirmed in Dole Food.1
Although no court has expressed this concept
in these terms, there are examples of the Supreme Court applying the 1952 Tate
Letter to conduct that occurred in 1920 and 1947-48149 and applying the FSIA to

143.

Brief for Petitioners at 35 n.15, Altmann, 123 S. Ct. at 46 (No. 03-13).

144.

Id.

145. Three opinions report the cases that arose from the forcible dispossession of Arnold
Bernstein's property by the Nazis in the period immediately prior to World War II: Bernstein v. Van
Heyghen FreresSociete Anonyme, 163 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1947) and Bernstein v. N.V. NederlandscheAmerikaansche, 173 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1949), rev'd, 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954).
146. Jurisdiction of United States Courts re Suits for Identifiable Property Involved in Nazi
Forced Transfers, State Dep't Press Release No. 296, reprinted in Bernstein, 210 F.2d at 375-76; 1949
Tate Letter, supra note 137.
147. See, e.g., In re Muir, 254 U.S. 522 (1921); In re Hussein Lutfi Bey, 256 U.S. 616 (1921); The
Gul Djemal, 264 U.S. 90, 91-94 (1924); The Navemar, 303 U.S. 67, 73-74 (1938); The Pesaro, 255 U.S.
216 (1921).
148. Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 123 S. Ct. 1655, 1662 (2003).
149. Nat'l City Bank of New York v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356, 357 nn.l-2 (1955).
Similarly, in Bernstein v. N. V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche,the court applied the principles stated in
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conduct that occurred in 1960 and 1975 because the evaluation
of immunity was
50
made at the time of suit, not at the time the action accrued.1
Fourth, the Nazis and their collaborators forfeited their rights, if any, to
sovereign immunity based on their perpetration of jus cogens violations and other
violations of firmly established restrictions of customary and conventional
international law.15 1 This argument was eloquently made by Judge Wald of the
District of Columbia Circuit in her dissenting opinion in Princz,152 in which she
stated:
In the mid-1940s, Germany could not, even in its wildest dreams, have expected the
executive branch of the United States, as a matter of grace and comity, to suggest
immunity for its enslavement and confinement (in three concentration camps) of an
American citizen during the Holocaust. The outcome of the Nuremberg trials
provides a clear signal that the international community, and particularly the United
States-one of the four nations that established the Nuremberg Tribunal-would not
have supported a broad enough immunity to shroud the atrocities committed during
the Holocaust. Indeed, the Nuremberg Tribunal denied the German defendants'
claims of official immunity because in the eyes of the international community
Germany as a whole was owed no immunity: "[h]e who violates the laws of war
cannot obtain immunity while acting in pursuance of the authority of the state if the
state in authorizing action moves outside its competence under International Law."
The Nuremberg Decision,6 F.R.D. 69, 110 (1946). Clearly, had the question been put
to them, the United States executive branch would have
153 opted to deny Germany's
claims to immunity for the crimes alleged in this case.
Although Altmann involves crimes of personal property and not genocide,
slavery, murder or brutality, the Ninth Circuit found Judge Wald's 154rationale
persuasive in Altmann H and adopted it in support of the court's decision.
IV. WOULD APPLICATION OF THE FSIA IN ALTMANN OPEN THE
DOOR TO SUBJECTIVE, INCONSISTENT AND UNPREDICTABLE
APPLICATIONS OF THE FSIA IN FUTURE CASES?
The last argument asserted by Austria is that an imaginative parade of horrors
would be unleashed if the Central District of California were found to be able to
exercise jurisdiction over Austria.' 55 The argument suggests that this outcome is
"unmanageable," because it will allow (or require) courts to speculate as to the
possible recommendations of the State Department in cases arising from facts that
the 1949 Tate Letter to Nazi conduct preceding and during World War II. 210 F.2d 375, 375-76 (2d Cir.
1954).
150. First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 619-21
(1983); Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 482-83, 486 (1983).
151.
See Princz v. Fed. Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1176-85 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (Wald, J.,
dissenting).
152.

Id.

153.
154.
155.

Id. at 1179 (citing Bernstein, 210 F.2d at 376 (2d Cir. 1954)).
Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 317 F.3d 954, 964 (9th Cir. 2002) ("Altman II").
Brief for Petitioners at 42-46, Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 123 S. Ct. 46 (2002) (No. 03-
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occurred decades ago, in the World War II era and earlier. 156 Apparently, Austria
believes the courts would have to research, interpret or predict the State
Department's position in order to evaluate whether Austria or other countries
would have expected to receive sovereign immunity if suit were brought at the time
57
the events occurred. 1
This last argument reveals a simple, but fundamental, misconception of the
process of sovereign immunity and the operation of the FSIA. As discussed above,
sovereign immunity is determined at the time of filing, based on the facts and status
of the parties at the time of filing. 158 It is not based on the status of the parties at
the time the events occurred. 159 The courts evaluate the status of the parties under
the definitions and standards of the FSIA. 160 The courts do not consult the State
Department in determining how to interpret the FSIA or consider how the State
Department would like to proceed on the issue of sovereign immunity. 161 Courts
do not research the historical record to predict what the State Department would
have recommended at the time the events occurred. It was these very interferences
and inconsistent recommendations by the State Department that prompted Congress
to pass the FSIA, granting the determination
of sovereign immunity to the courts
62
and removing it from the executive branch. 1
V. CONCLUSION
The FSIA should be construed as a jurisdictional statute whose terms apply to
Altmann's claims arising from operative facts that arose prior to the effective date
of the Act, regardless of whether these facts also occurred prior to the 1952 Tate
Letter. None of Austria's arguments against the application of the FSIA are
meritorious. The FSIA does not have a retroactive effect on litigation involving
facts that occurred during the World War II era. The FSIA is a quintessential
"jurisdiction-allocating" statute, and its passage did not alter the jurisdictional
nature of sovereign immunity law in the United States. Thus, the FSIA does not
have an improper retroactive effect under Landgraf In order to find for Austria,
the Supreme Court would have to overturn Dole Food and find that sovereign
immunity determinations under the FSIA must be based on the status of the parties
at the time the operative events occurred, rather than the parties' status at the time
the suit was filed.
Contrary to its arguments, Austria would not have enjoyed sovereign immunity
in the United States for claims to recover property stolen by the Nazis in the World
War II era. Application of the FSIA in Altmann will not open the door to
subjective, inconsistent, and unpredictable applications of the FSIA in future cases,

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

See Brief for Petitioners at 42-44, Altmann, 123 S. Ct. at 46 (No. 03-13).
See id.
Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 123 S. Ct. 1655, 1662-63 (2003).
Id.
Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 462 U.S. 480, 488 (1983).
Id.
See H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 7-8 (1976).
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because courts will not be forced to predict reactions and recommendations of the
United States State Department in World War II and earlier times. These
arguments are, in fact, irrelevant. It does not matter what Austria expected in 1948,
because sovereign immunity determinations are made at the time of filing, based on
the parties' status at the time of filing. The Supreme Court should not consider
what might have happened if the suit had been brought immediately after the war;
it should only evaluate the application of the FSIA, a jurisdictional statute, based on
the status of the Republic of Austria and the Austrian National Gallery in 2000.
Therefore, the Supreme Court should find that the FSIA applies and provides
jurisdiction over Austria in Maria Altmann's suit against Austria and the Austrian
National Gallery.

